Indus Water Treaty: Obstacles, Exploitation and a Belated Reckoning

1.1) Since the Treaty was signed, Pakistan has used its dispute settlement provisions as a strategic tool to delay and effectively hinder development, rather than as a genuine dispute resolution.Virtually every major hydropower project proposed by India on western rivers – even those expressly permitted by treaty terms – has faced formal objections from Pakistan, technical challenges or submissions to arbitration.Projects including Baglihar, Kishenganga, Parkaldur and Tulpur have suffered from persistent challenges from Pakistan.In some cases, Pakistan has acknowledged the potential benefits of India’s projects to regulate water flows, including flood mitigation, but has also opposed them.This pattern suggests that Pakistan’s objections are not really about treaty compliance; they are aimed at blocking Indian developments in Jammu and Kashmir, regardless of their legal basis.1.2) The “water war” narrative and its deployment: Pakistan simultaneously exploits India’s consistent compliance with the Treaty to construct and propagate an international narrative that portrays India as a potential “water aggressor.”Pakistani officials, academics and diplomatic channels have repeatedly raised India’s concerns about Pakistan’s “weaponization of water”, citing treaties to which India strictly adheres.This narrative of upstream riparian areas as a threat proved highly effective for an international audience unfamiliar with the treaty’s history.Pakistan uses it to create diplomatic pressure, attract multilateral sympathy and limit India’s ability to assert its legitimate treaty rights.The unique irony of this strategy is that India has not violated the treaty — not during the 1965 war, not during the 1971 war, not during the 1999 Kargil conflict, nor at any other point in the treaty’s 65 years of existence.Even though Pakistan uses its territory to carry out state-sponsored terrorism against India, India remains compliant.2. Impact on India2.1) Unrealized Development Potential: The Treaty’s restrictions had a measurable and lasting impact on India’s development in the Indus Basin.Large swathes of Rajasthan and Punjab could be irrigated but remain dry or dependent on alternative, more expensive water sources.Sixty years of lost agricultural productivity means immeasurable economic losses.2.2) Jammu and Kashmir’s hydropower potential is suppressed: The impact on Jammu and Kashmir is particularly severe. The federal territory straddles the Western Rivers and has huge and largely untapped hydropower potential.The development of this potential is constrained at every turn by the design constraints of the treaty, systemic opposition by Pakistan, and the permanent risk of a multi-layered, long-term dispute settlement mechanism.Increasingly, local populations see the Treaty not as a framework for shared interests but as a tool to marginalize their own economies – an externally imposed means that prevents them from exploiting the natural resources that flow through their territories.2.3) Impact on energy security: India’s inability to optimally develop the hydropower potential of western rivers has a direct impact on national energy security.The constraints of the treaty mean that potential capacity – as clean, renewable and cost-effective energy – has been sacrificed purely because of strategic obstruction by Pakistan and even the limited rights that India has in this asymmetric agreement.3. The case of India: The purpose of the treaty was to achieve “the fullest and most satisfactory utilization of the Indus system” in a “spirit of goodwill and friendship”, but this context no longer exists.The legitimacy of these treaties comes not only from the validity of the law, but also from the sincere implementation of its provisions by all signatories.Pakistan’s documented continued use of state-sponsored terrorism as a foreign policy tool against India, culminating in atrocities including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and most recently the April 2025 Pahalgam attack, fundamentally challenges the premise of India’s continued compliance with IWT.Bilateral agreements cannot be implemented selectively. A country cannot violate basic norms of inter-state conduct while simultaneously requiring its negotiating partners to fulfill treaty obligations, which would disproportionately benefit the spoilers.The treaty cannot become an island of Indian compliance in a sea of ​​Pakistani malignity. India’s move represents a long overdue assertion – that international agreements are a two-way street.4. Conclusion: The Indus Waters Treaty has long been hailed as a triumph of international diplomacy.This article argues that this characterization fundamentally misrepresents what actually happened: During the negotiations, Pakistan’s intransigence was compromised, while India’s goodwill was systematically exploited to achieve a deal that was unfair from the outset.Nonetheless, India handed over 80% of its water, paid £62 million (about $2.5 billion in current value) to facilitate that handover, accepted restrictions imposed one-sidedly on its territory, and has maintained strict compliance for 65 years, including by waging multiple wars through Pakistan and continuing to support cross-border terrorism.In return, India received a treaty that was agreed to in good faith, which Pakistan used as a tool to hinder development, create a “water war” narrative internationally that had no basis in fact, and resulted in permanent underdevelopment of large swathes of Indian territory.India’s move is to protect its legitimate interests in the Indus River Basin. This is not aggression, it is attack. It was a belated corrective to an asymmetrical arrangement that was premised on good intentions but never reciprocated.For those asking why the treaty is suspended now, it is useful to remember that there is no wrong time for the right decision.