NATO will continue to exist after the United States withdraws its troops. But what kind of alliance will it become?

The Trump administration has taken a series of steps in recent weeks that are widely seen across Europe as retaliation for allies’ reluctance to more forcefully support the U.S. position in the war with Iran.

It has announced the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from Germany, halted the deployment of 4,000 troops to Poland and is reportedly even considering taking steps to suspend Spain’s membership in the alliance.

Europe is already uneasy about Washington’s broader strategic intentions.

NATO allies are increasingly realizing that they can no longer rely on the United States for security and must shoulder greater responsibilities themselves.

NATO 3.0

======

US President Donald Trump’s narrow understanding of the value of alliances has long been known. Now, his vision for a new NATO is coming into view.

At the NATO Defense Ministers’ Meeting in February, Elbridge Colby, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, proposed the concept of “NATO 3.0”. This would give the Europeans a greater role in conventional deterrence. At the same time, the United States will prioritize strategic competition with China and support European security more selectively and from a longer distance.

Meanwhile, the White House has reportedly been pushing for an expansion of NATO’s decades-old mission and excluding Ukraine and four of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partners from an annual summit in July.

This reflects a broader shift in U.S. strategic thinking. NATO is no longer seen as a political community and a pillar of the liberal international order. It is increasingly seen as a narrower military arrangement whose value depends on whether the Europeans can shoulder more of the burden themselves and continue to comply with Trump’s agenda.

In this new paradigm, the United States is not just asking its European allies to spend more. It tells Europe to do more with less American hardware, looser political alliances and fewer guarantees.

There is also a deeper problem: the erosion of trust within the alliance and the assumptions that have underpinned NATO’s deterrence posture for decades.

The result is that the emergence of a “Europeanized NATO” is inevitable, not designed. What such an alliance would actually look like remains unclear.

Focus on collective defense

=================

One thing is certain: One country will not simply replace the United States as alliance leader. No European country has the capacity, resources or political legitimacy to play this role alone. Instead, leadership is likely to come from the countries best able to act together.

This trend is already evident in the “European minilateral moment”. For example, the E3 group and the newly formed E5 alliance have begun to accelerate coordination among Europe’s major military powers.

These arrangements are not a substitute for NATO. Rather, they could become a mechanism for organizing a stronger European focus within NATO.

But this is where the uncertainty begins. A more European NATO is far from a guarantee of a more cohesive NATO. The alliance has long struggled with strategic conflicts among its 32 members due to differing threat perceptions, regional priorities and strategic cultures.

As U.S. leadership declines, these divisions are likely to become more acute and difficult to manage.

A more European alliance, at least initially, might narrow its focus on collective defense and deterrence to counter Russian militarism and its ongoing war in Ukraine.

A broader post-Cold War agenda that expanded to include crisis management and cooperative security may increasingly become secondary. This includes efforts to address global security challenges, counterterrorism operations, and enhance energy and maritime security.

However, many NATO allies, particularly those on NATO’s southern flank, still believe that crisis management and cooperative security must remain core functions of the alliance.

For countries in North Africa and the Middle East facing instability, migrant pressure, terrorism and maritime insecurity, NATO cannot be concerned only with Russia.

NATO’s security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are also increasingly important, although they no longer receive overt support from the U.S. government.

Cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand may have emerged as NATO’s most promising cooperative security framework, precisely because it strengthens the alliance’s core deterrence mission.

Unlike many earlier partnership initiatives, this is directly linked to defense industry collaboration, technological resilience, security of supply chains for critical defense materials, and strategic signaling.

new reality

=========

“New NATO” is by no means an established contract. It’s a coalition caught between competing visions, deeply uncertain political commitments from its erstwhile supporters, and unresolved strategic questions.

Europe is taking greater responsibility for its security, but there is no clear consensus on what greater strategic autonomy ultimately means.

The central question facing NATO today is not whether the alliance will survive. It almost certainly will in some form, as we should never underestimate the binding power of bureaucracy.

The real question is what kind of alliance will emerge and how credible it will be. Will it be a narrower military agreement focused on continental defense? Or a broader political-security community capable of responding to the various crises affecting Europe? Binh Duong

Binh Duong

This article was generated from automated news agency feeds without modifications to the text.